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Article 4

CONGRESS, COURTS AND CORRECTIONS:
AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT
BrianJ. Ostrom*
Roger A. Hansont
Fred L. Cheesman 11
INTRODUCTION

Let us review the numbers. By the mid-1990s, state prisoners
challenging the conditions of their confinement accounted for the
single largest category of civil lawsuits filed in U.S. district courts. During the peak year of 1996, the number of prisoner lawsuits filed had
grown to 41,302, a total representing more than one in every six federal civil lawsuits filed that year.I These cases were noteworthy not
only for their sheer number and rapid growth, but also for being the
*
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thank Ronald S. Everett, Ph.D. and the staff of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts for their assistance throughout the research.
1 The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts counts cases on aJuly 1 toJune 30
basis. Hence, the 41,302 cases represent the number of lawsuits filed by state prisoners in U.S. district courts between July 1, 1995 and June 30, 1996. The data used to
investigate terminations of § 1983 lawsuits filed by state prisoners in U.S. district
courts were prepared by the Federal Judicial Center and stored in a publicly accessible database maintained by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research (ICPSR) at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu. See Federal Judicial Center, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 1970-2000 (ICPSR No. 8429) Nos. 87-88, 98,
103-04, 115-17 [hereinafter ICPSR 8429]. Aggregate statistics on prisoner litigation
are also available at Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, FederalDistrict-Court
Civil Cases, at http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questcv3.htm (last visited Mar. 26,
2003) [hereinafter Federal District-Court Civil Cases]. This site utilizes a database of
about five million federal district-court civil cases terminated over the last twenty-two
fiscal years. The data were gathered by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
assembled by the Federal Judicial Center, and disseminated by the ICPSR.
I

1526

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:5

federal court case type with the lowest plaintiff win rate: prisoner litigants were successful in only 1.4% of lawsuits filed. 2 These three basic facts-volume, trend, and outcome-underlay passage by the U.S.
Congress of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).3 Going into
effect in April, 1996, the PLRA significantly altered the legal circumstances under which prisoners could file a lawsuit challenging the conditions of their confinement. 4 Four years later in 2000, the total
number of prisoner lawsuits filed in federal courts had fallen by over
40% to just over 24,400.5 Such dramatic change deserves closer scrutiny, and, by looking inside the numbers, we gain critical perspective
on the world of prisoner litigation post-PLRA.

2 FederalDistrict-CourtCivil Cases, supra note 1.
3 Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 101,
801-810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-1377 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
4 A prisoner begins the litigation process by filing a complaint. This document
is submitted to a court of clerk's office. The clerk of court makes an initial decision
whether to accept the complaint and place it on the court's docket as a lawsuit with a
case number. Almost all complaints follow the same format because virtually all district courts have accepted a "model" complaint form developed by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC). The FJC created a standard complaint form to assist prisoners in
stating their issues as clearly as possible and simultaneously to assist the courts in
discerning the basis of the complaint. The FJC encouraged courts to follow particular
procedures in initially assessing these complaints for the purpose of docketing them.
Courts responded positively to these suggestions as a way to avoid spending unnecessary time determining whether to accept a complaint as a § 1983 lawsuit. See generally FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER
CIVIL RIGIS CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1980) for descriptions of the procedures

and the "model" complaint form. The PLRA modified the requirements for a complaint to be docketed (i.e., accepted by a court as a lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000)). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (2000), infra note 26, for discussion of the new
requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
(2000), infra note 28. Under the discussion of screening, the PLRA states what a
court is supposed to do in reviewing a complaint "before docketing, if feasible or, in
any event, as soon as practicable after docketing." Id. The prescribed action includes
dismissing a complaint "if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief." Id. Failure to meet the requirements means that a complaint does not become a lawsuit if the failute is detected "before docketing." See id.
Hence, it seems fair and valid to infer from such provisions that the PLRA is an effort
to limit the number of lawsuits. See also infra notes 25 & 29. Whether it achieves this
goal depends on whether the sorts of complaints filed by prisoners meet the new
requirements.

5 JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OFJUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PRISONER PETITIONS
FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 2000 WITH TRENDS 1980-2000, at 2, 2002 NCJ 189430.
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Reaction to the PLRA was immediate and contentious. Many crit-

ics argued the Act was unconstitutional, 6 while proponents heralded
the PLRA as necessary and effective reform. 7 Given the substantive
complexity of the PLRA, much legal scholarship has been directed to
analyzing the numerous constitutional challenges resolved and being
resolved in federal courts. Considerably less attention has been given,
however, to another area of uncertainty-that is, the actual impact of
the new legislation on volume, trend, and outcomes.
The PLRA had two major teatures. The first focused on governing thejudicial role following a court determination of unconstitutional prison conditions such as overcrowding and inadequate
medical care. 8 The second dealt with complaints brought by individ6 See, e.g., Thomas J. Butler, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: A Separation of Powers
Dilemma, 50ALA. L. REV. 585 (1997);Joseph T. Lukens, The PrisonLitigation Reform Act:
Three Strikes and You're Out of Court-It May Be Effective, But Is It Constitutional?, 70
TEMP. L. REV. 471 (1997); Catherine G. Patsos, The Constitutionality and Implications of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 N.Y.L. Sci-L. L. REV. 205 (1998);Julie M. Riewe, The
Least Among Us: UnconstitutionalChanges in PrisonerLitigation Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, 47 DUKE L.J. 117 (1997); James E. Robertson, Psychological Injury

and the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A "Not Exactly" Equal ProtectionAnalysis, 37 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 105 (2000).

7 See, e.g., Peter Hobart, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Striking the Balance Between Law and Order, 44 VILL. L. REv. 981 (1999); EugeneJ. Kuzinski, The End of the
Prison Law Firm?: Frivolous Inmate Litigation,Judicial Oversight, and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 361 (1998).
8 There is a coherent body of literature on "conditions cases." Leading contributors include BRADLEY CHILTON, PRISONS UNDER THE GAVEL: THE FEDERAL COURT
TAKEOVER OF THE GEORGIA PRISONS (1991); BEN M. CROUCH & JAMES W. MARQUART,
AN APPEAL TOJUSTICE: LITIGATED REFORM OF TEXAS PRISONS (1989);JOHN DIIULIO,JR.,
GOVERNING PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE
MALCOLM M.

STUDY OF CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT

(1987);

FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN

STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS

(1999);

STEVE

J.

&
(1987);

MARTIN

SHELDON EKLAND-OLSEN, TEXAS PRIsoNs: THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN

LARRY W. YACKLE, REFORM AND REGRET: THE STORY OF FEDERAL-JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT

IN THE ALABAMA PRISON SYSTEM (1989); and Malcolm M. Feeley & Roger A. Hanson,

The Impact ofJudicialIntervention on Prison andJails: A Framework for Analysis and a Review of the Literature, in COURTS, CORRECrIONS, AND THIE CONSTITUTION: TIE IMPACT OF
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON PRISONS AND JAILS (John

J. Dilulio, Jr. ed., 1990). There

are provisions in the PLRA that bear on "conditions" cases. One key provision is that

time limitations are placed on the duration of court-ordered temporary injunctive
and prospective relief. Additionally, limitations are placed on the amount of fees that
can be paid to attorneys representing successful prisoner plaintiffs. Finally, compensatory damages to successful prisoner plaintiffs must first be paid to satisfy any outstanding restitution orders against the prisoners. Interestingly, scholars are not
necessarily overly anxious or fearful that these provisions spell the end of conditions
cases. See, e.g., FEELEY & RUBIN, supra,at 382-84 (noting that the era of "mega-conditions cases" has already wound down and that the real effect that these laws will have
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ual prisoners. This latter component, designed to limit "frivolous" litigation, drove much of the congressional debate and was clearly
intended to reduce the number of prisoner lawsuits filed. Because a
large proportion of prisoner lawsuits were being dismissed, the presumption by many drafting the PLRA was that most were frivolous, 9
and numerous examples were assembled in support of that viewpoint."' As a consequence, the PLRA provisions for dealing with frivolous litigation, primarily restrictions on filing in forma pauperis for
previous frivolousness and the assessment of filing fees, focused on
increasing the costs to prisoners of even proceeding to the filing stage.
The goal was to purge the frivolous cases before they ever enter the
system.
In this Article, we step outside the larger debate on constitutionality to examine the empirical record. Our goal is to assess the manner in which the PLRA has affected the volume, trend, and outcomes
of prisoner lawsuits. The specific objectives are threefold. In Part I we
set the stage by examining the nature of prisoner litigation just prior
to the enactment of the PLRA. This involves a recap of filing trends as
well as pertinent literature, case law, and congressional action in the
area of prisoner litigation. The stated rationale for the PLRA was to
curb "frivolous" litigation; yet, the term frivolous can be more provocative than descriptive. Prisoner lawsuits are dismissed for many reasons, and the debate over the latest congressional effort at reform will
benefit from a more nuanced understanding of why cases were being
dismissed pre-PLRA and how the manner of disposition has changed
post-PLRA. Drawing on a previous individual case level study,1 ' combined with data gathered by the U.S. Administrative Office of the
Courts (AO), we examine more closely the nature of prisoner litigaon conditions cases is unknown). For the purposes of setting an appropriate and
manageable limit to the scope of the current research, Feeley and Rubin's views of
these provisions are accepted. Hence, our cynosure is dedicated exclusively to understanding the changes brought by the PLRA in the number of § 1983 lawsuits filed by
individual prisoners, which should bear on past policy debates among practitioners.
9 See, e.g., 141 CONG. Rhc. S14,418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (urging legislation to "bring relief to a civil justice system overburdened by
frivolous prisoner lawsuits").
10 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S14,629 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995). Proponents of the
PLRA presented "top ten" lists of frivolous prisoner litigation nationally and in Arizona. Making the list were cases such as a prisoner suing for the right to have smooth
rather than chunky peanut butter, a suit over a Nintendo Gameboy, and a suit involving a prisoner's right to eat ice cream. Id.
11 ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHALLENGING
THE CONDITIONS OF PRISONS AND JAILS: A REPORT ON SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, 1994
NCJ 151652 (1995).
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tion at the dawn of the PLRA. These results also provide a benchmark
for assessing subsequent changes in filing patterns and dispositional
outcomes.
In Part II we introduce an approach to modeling the trend in
prisoner litigation and testing statistically the impact of the PLRA on
national and circuit court filing patterns. The analysis uncovers and
confirms the differential impact of the PLRA at the circuit court level.
This Part also provides a preliminary analysis of how the PLRA has
affected the resolution., of prisoner litigation. The Article concludes
that the impact of the PLRA on observed patterns of prisoner litigation is largely in line with the goals stated by the authors of the legislation in that filings are down in all circuits. Yet despite the common
theme of fewer prisoner lawsuits, there is considerable variation circuit by circuit in how these cases are being resolved.
I.

HISTORY, LITERATURE, AND PRACTICE

A.

A Short History

The U.S. Supreme Court made a series of ground-breaking decisions in the 1950s and 1960s, providing a foundation for state prisoners to challenge the conditions of confinement. 12 Whereas prisoners
historically had the opportunity to file writs of habeas corpus to challenge the validity of their detention and imprisonment, the parallel
opportunity to challenge the conditions of confinement did not
emerge until more recently. The Court reversed a "hands-off" approach to incarceration with its decision in 1964 that state prisoners
could avail themselves of the federal trial process and file lawsuits
seeking money damages when correctional policies, procedures, and
practices violated the prisoners' rights.' Beginning in the 1970s, a
wide ranging category of rights were defined by the U.S. Supreme
Court and the U.S. courts of appeal.1 4 Because these cases are filed
12

The development of the prisoner rights movement, which the U.S. Supreme

Court's decisions fostered, is described

well in JAMES B. JACOBS,

STATEVILLE:

THE

PENI-

passim (1977).
13 See Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964).
14 Prisoners' rights recognized in these decisions included religious freedom to
members of minority religions in Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), adequate medical
treatment in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976), protection against excessive
force by correctional officers in Hudson v. Mcmillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), protection
against violence by other inmates in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), due
process in disciplinary hearings in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and access
to law libraries in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). A description of the cases
establishing prisoners' rights is available in SHELDON KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTENTIARY IN MASS SOCIETY

TIONS AND PRISONERS'

RIGi-rrs

IN A NUTSHELL

(1983).
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under § 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code, they are commonly called
§ 1983 lawsuits.
Initially, the number of § 1983 lawsuits filed nationally in the
1960s was small. The Administrative Office counted only 218 cases in
all U.S. district courts during 1966, the first year that state prisoners'
lawsuits were recorded as a specific category of litigation. 15 The debate over prisoner litigation heated up as the numbers of lawsuits filed
in U.S. district courts rose to a visible level. Within five years of Cooper
v. Pate,16 the number of cases had reached approximately 2500 and
continued to grow without any appreciable decrease through 1995.17
Critics contend that most prisoner lawsuits are frivolous, that they
crowd already crowded court dockets, and, in the few cases when meritorious, that they resemble small claims cases best handled outside
the federal courts. In response, defenders of prisoners' rights asserted
that § 1983 lawsuits are not burdensome and that they cannot and
should not be screened out of the court system because no one knows
how many are frivolous or without merit. Furthermore, they should
not be siphoned out of the federal system because the state courts
might not be sufficiently independent when prisoners take the state to
court. 18

16

& DALEY, supra note 11, at 2.
378 U.S. 546 (1964).

17

Annual data on the number of prisoner civil rights and prison conditions law-

15

HANSON

suits filed in any given year can be found in Table C-3 of the corresponding volume

of

ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS

OF THE UNITED

STATES COURTs, an annual publication produced by the AO.

18 The composition of the critics includes a former Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, other federal judges, law professors, and correctional officials. See, e.g.,
Federalism and the FederalJudiciary:lHearings Before the Subcomm. on the Separation of Powers
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 220-26 (1983) (statement of John R.
Manson); A.E. DICK HOWARD, I'LL SEE YOU IN COURT: THE STATES AND THE SUPREME
COURT (1980); FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE (1990); RICHARD A. POSNER, TH-E FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
(1985); Patrick Baude, Federal Courts and Prison Reform, 52 IND. L.J. 761 (1977); Warren E. Burger, An Agenda for Crime Prevention and CorrectionalReform, 67 A.B.A. J. 988
(1981); Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of theJudiciary, 62 A.B.A. J. 443
(1976); and Warren E. Burger, A Proposal: National Conference on Correctional
Problems, (1969) (paper presented at the American Bar Association Meeting, Dallas)
(on file with author). Interestingly, the advocates of prisoners' rights and federal
court resolution of § 1983 lawsuits look very similar to the critics in terms of their
positions. The advocates include a former Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court, other federal judges, and law professors. See Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983

and Federal Protectionof Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. I (1985); Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts: A Causation-BasedApproach to the Search for Appropriate Reme-
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A major congressional response to the increasing volume of prisoner litigation occurred in 1980 when Congress passed the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA). 19 Under CRIPA,
state correctional agencies could voluntarily seek certification of their
grievance procedures from the Attorney General and federal courts.
If certified, the procedures then would have to be exhausted prior to
the filing of lawsuits against state correctional officers. 20 CRIPA never
really took hold because few states sought certification, and, with the
exception of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, few fed21
eral judges showed an inclination to certify state mechanisms.
The expansion of prisoners' rights and the limited impact of
CRIPA created the potential for increasing prisoner lawsuits, but it
was unprecedented growth in prison population that made it a reality.
Between 1972 and 1996,22 the number of state prisoner § 1983 lawsuits filed in U.S. district courts increased by 1153% (from 3348 to
42,522), while state prison population increased by 517% (from
174,379 to 1,076,625).23 As shown in Figure 1, the increase in both
trends was remarkably consistent until the enactment of the PLRA in
1996. The close visual correspondence between the number of state
prisoners and the number of § 1983 lawsuits since the early 1970s is
24
borne out by statistical analysis.

dies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871 (1983); William Bennett Turner, When PrisonersSue: Section
1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1979).
19 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96247, 94 Stat. 349 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997).
20

Feeley & Hanson, supra note 8, at 31-32.

21

Id.

22 While 1966 was the first year that state prisoners' lawsuits were recorded as a
specific category of litigation by the AO, data supplied by the AO commenced in
1972.
23 Fred Cheesman II et al., A Tale of Two Laws: The U.S. Congress Confronts Habeas
Corpus Petitions and Section 1983 Lawsuits, 22 LAw & POL'V 89, 94 (2000).
24 See id. for a complete analysis of the link between prison population and the
volume of prisoner litigation. Cheesman and his co-authors developed a dynamic
regression model using state prisoner population as the independent variable to forecast the expected number of prisoner lawsuits in the future. In addition, the model
was used to estimate the volume of prisoner litigation ten years down the road. The
approach used was based on the observed trend in prisoner litigation following the
implementation of the PLRA, an appreciation for the initial uncertainty in the litigation environment created by the passage of new law, and the strong established relationship between prison population and the volume of prisoner litigation. Finally,
this effort to chart the future course of prisoner litigation was the basis for estimating
how changing filing patterns affected the work of the federal bench. Id. passim.
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Lukens succinctly sums up the perspective of reformers in the
mid-1990s: "[b]ecause the number of state and federal prisoners continue[d] to increase at an alarming rate, it [was] clear that Congress
had to take some steps to address the increasing burden on the federal courts arising out of the tremendous increase in prisoner civil
rights litigation." 25 And the PLRA was born.
B.

PLRA Provisions

There are three provisions of this statute especially relevant to
understanding the trends in case filings. They are:
First, inmates must exhaust all available administrative remedies
before filing the case, even if a facility's grievance procedures have not
been certified by the U.S. Department of Justice or a federal court. 26
Second, inmates filing lawsuits in forma pauperis (as an indigent
without liability for court fees and costs) are required to pay the appropriate filing fees (and costs, where applicable) from their existing
25

Lukens, supra note 6, at 491-92 (footnote omitted).

26 The PLRA amended suits by prisoners of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act, CRIPA § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000). The PLRA added the following
language: "(a) Applicability of Administrative Remedies. No action shall be brought
with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. This provision does not prohibit prisoners from bringing challenges to prison conditions
under a state law or constitution without exhausting state remedies, but that action
would be precluded from being filed in federal court. It would have to be filed in
state court.
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assets or any funds available to them through their trust fund accounts
27
within the correctional system.
Third, inmates are prohibited from filing lawsuits in forma
pauperis if the inmates have filed three or more actions in federal
court that were dismissed as frivolous or malicious or for failing to
28
state a claim on which relief can be granted.
The import of these requirements is that until and unless they are
satisfied, federal trial courts need not accept a prisoner's rights case
simply because a prisoner has filed a complaint. The courts are not
required to docket the complaint as a case, give it a case number, and
place it in the queue for court action.

27 The PLRA amended § 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code. The following language was added: "(b) (1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a prisoner brings
a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to
pay the full amount of a filing fee." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1) (a). Procedures were
specified in the PLRA on how the fees were to be paid.
28 The PLRA amended § 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code by adding
the following language:
(g) In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal ajudgment in
a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or
more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought
an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the
grounds that it is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Again, this provision pertains to complaints filed in federal
court and does not bear on suits filed in state court.
The PLRA amended Chapter 123 of Title 28 of the United States Code. The
following language was added:
§1915A Screening. (a) Screening. The court shall review, before docketing,
if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal. On review, the court shall identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
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Literature

The plain intent of the PLRA is to reduce the volume of prisoner
litigation. 29 While the post-PLRA decline in prisoner lawsuits is apparent now, at the time the legislation was introduced there was considerable uncertainty over whether the PLRA would lead to a decrease,
increase, or no change in the volume of prisoner litigation."0 Yet this
issue has received little attention in the academic literature. Because

the primary focus of the sizable and growing number of law review
articles on the PLRA tends toward critical analysis of the PLRA's constitutional validity, the authors are typically agnostic or silent on the
legislation's observable effects on the volume of litigation. 3 ' This

brief review of the literature helps shape the subsequent analyses by
29 See, e.g., Kincade v. Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that
"the text of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act itself reflects that the drafters' primary
objective was to curb prison condition litigation"); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,
1488 (1lth Cir. 1997) (stating that "Congress promulgated the act to curtail abusive
[prisoner litigation]"); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that "[tlhe legislation was aimed at the skyrocketing numbers of claims filed by
prisoners-many of which are meritless-and the corresponding burden those filings
have placed on the federal courts").
30 While many in the 104th Congress argued that the PLRA would reduce the
number of § 1983 cases filed, others disagreed. During congressional debate, Senator
Paul Simon stated his concern that the new legislation would actually increase the
volume of lawsuits. 142 CONG. REC. S2297 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Simon).
31 See, e.g.,
Gigette M. Bejin, The 1995 Legislationfor PrisonerLitigation Reform: Has
the Pendulum Swung the Other Way?, 74 U. DET. MERcy L. REv. 557 (1997); Hobart,
supra note 7;-Jason E. Pepe, Challenging Congress's Latest Attempt to Confine Prisoners'
ConstitutionalRights: EqualProtection and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 23 HAMLINE L.
REV. 59 (1999); Robertson, supra note 6. In contrast, practitioners who have been
following the trends in prisoner litigation and who are aware of past debates understandably are more cognizant of possible and actual changes in the number of lawsuits than either legal scholars or the law and society scholars focused on conditions
cases. As it turns out, ChiefJustice William Rehnquist, who fits the description of an
interested practitioner, responded with alacrity to the immediate consequences of
PLRA. He extolled and heralded the changes that he could discern. See William H.
Rehnquist, Soluble Problems for the I'ederalJudiciary: Curtailing the Expansion of Federal
jurisdiction and Other Matters, 35 Cr. REV. 4 (Fall 1998). Media covering the PLRA and
its impact actually responded even more quickly. See Harvey Berkman, Reform Act Cuts
PrisonerSuits, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 18, 1997, at A10. Interestingly, legal scholars continued
to be skeptical of the PLRA's effects on the trends in filings. For example, Tushnet
and Yackle observed that despite the report of a decrease in filing rates by the National LawJournal that they "think that evidence from a rare extended period of time
is necessary before one could confidently attribute such a decline to the statute."
Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the
Antiterrorim and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE
L.J. 1, 64 n.316 (1997).
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making explicit several issues that are best addressed through empirical study.
Initial skepticism over the impact of the PLRA on prisoner litigation was stated most cogently and bluntly in a closely reasoned analysis
of the new law conducted by Tushnet and Yackle.3 2 They argued that
the federal courts will work to "harmonize the [PLRA's] provisions
with preexisting law,"3 therefore leading courts to interpret the new
provision in a manner as to make only "marginal changes to preexisting law." 34 They go on to predict that the "PLRA's provisions dealing
with frivolous individual litigation probably will have [little] practical
impact" and will result in "little change" in the volume of prisoner
litigation.3 5 While it is difficult to say how individual judges gauge the
statutory consequences of individual provisions of the PLRA, it is possible to measure the change in the number of § 1983 lawsuits filed. By
benefit of hindsight we know the number of prisoner lawsuits has
fallen, but statistical analysis is needed to determine whether the decline is only "marginal" or if the PLRA marks a significant breaking
point in the long-term trend of prisoner litigation.
Many authors examine constitutional challenges to the PLRA and
often reference the variation in interpretation at the circuit court
level. Butler neatly summarizes the legal environment following passage of the PLRA: "[t] he Act raised constitutional separation of powers concerns immediately after it was passed. As a result, prison rights
activists began challenging the PLRA ... [and t] he current status of

PLRA litigation varies from circuit to circuit." 3 6 Hobart goes further,
analyzing the current state of the PLRA with respect to eleven separate provisions of the Act. His analysis is necessarily at the circuit level
as he explores the extent of agreement and disagreement over interpretation of each provision. 37 Such analysis carries the assumption, at
32
33
34

Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 31.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 48. In summary, they state,
Whatever the PLRA achieves, then, cannot be very far different from what

existing law prescribes-or what the courts themselves prescribe were they
faced with some of the issues that statute addresses. The basic standard set
out in the PLRA . . . either restates existing law, is unconstitutional, or
changes existing law in minor ways.
Id. at 58.
35 Id. at 64.
36 Butler, sup/ra note 6, at 586.
37 Hobart, supra note 7, at 986-87. Hobart states, for example, that
Like many other aspects of the PLRA, controversy revolves around the retroactivity of the attorney fee provision. For example, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has concluded that all attorney fees
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least implicitly, that judicial interpretation of the PLRA provisions affects the operation of the law in practice. Given non-uniformity in
legal interpretation at the circuit level, a natural question is whether
this translates into differences in observed patterns of prisoner litigation at the circuit level.
As the observed reality of a decline in prisoner lawsuits became
apparent, some authors raised the fundamental question of whether
the PLRA was sufficient to differentiate the frivolous from the meritorious. Lukens states that the PLRA "is much broader than necessary
to achieve the intended reduction in frivolous prisoner litigation, and
brings within its broad sweep meritorious claims as well as frivolous
claims." '38 The concern is that the blunt character of the PLRA restrictions will allow the circuits too easily to reject a prisoner's lawsuit regardless of merit. A somewhat different tack is taken by Kuzinski, who
argues, "However deserving some claims are, the majority of inmate
claims are either meritless or overtly frivolous." 3 9 As a consequence,
courts are awash in 'junk litigation"'' 4 to the detriment of prisoners
with valid claims. Recognizing that an overabundance of lawsuits without merit can usurp the meritorious, one circuit judge notes the prisoner with a valid claim "must hope that in the sea of frivolous prisoner
complaints, [their] lone, legitimate cry for relief will be heard by a
clerk, magistrate or judge grown weary of battling the waves of frivolity." 4 1 The empirical question, then, is how does the composition of
prisoner lawsuits pre-PLRA compare to the composition post-PLRA?
One measure of success for proponents of the PLRA is showing that
the elimination of frivolous lawsuits has been the source of decline in
§ 1983 filings.
D. Practice
Understanding the reality of prisoner litigation requires taking a
closer look at how, in fact, § 1983 cases are resolved. Examining the
awarded after the passage of the PLRA must conform to its restrictions.
Conversely, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Eighth
Circuit [sic] maintain that is would be manifestly unjust to apply the PLRA's
restrictions to cases pending at the time of its passage.
Id. (footnote omitted).
38 Lukens, supra note 6, at 472.
39 Kuzinski, supra note 7, at 364.
40 J.W.

HOWARD, JR., COURTS

OF APPEAL

IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM

283

(1981) (implying that prisoner litigation is an exemplar of 'junk litigation," forcing
virtually all federal circuit courts to shift part of their business from hand-crafted to
mass-production decision techniques).
41 Kuzinski, supra note 7, at 369 (footnote omitted).
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data compiled by the AO (Figure 2) for the years immediately preceding enactment of the PLRA confirms that the majority of prisoner lawsuits are dismissed outright (78% in 1993). Only about 3% were
resolved by jury or non-jury trial in 1993. Moreover, the manner of
disposition is very consistent for the period 1993-1996.
FIGURE

2.

MANNER OF DISPOSITION FOR §

Resolution
Court Voluntary
w/o
Year Judgment Dismissal Dismissal Settled
Pre-PLRA
1976
2354
1536 24,195
1993 N
6.4
7.6
78.1
5.0
%
2379
2405
1778 27,186
1994 N
6.8
6.9
77.6
5.1
%
2347
2476
2058 31,954
1995 N
5.9
6.2
79.9
5.1
%
2168
2494
2071 33,369
1996 N
5.2
6.0
80.8
5.0
%
PostPLRA
1997 N
%
1998 N
%
1999 N
%
2000 N
%
SOURCE:

1330
3.9
1166
4.0
1342
5.2
1497
6.2

27,574
81.3
23,803
82.3
21,098
82.4
19,686
81.4

2242
6.6
1677
5.8
1260
4.9
1291
5.3

1722
5.1
1457
5.0
1140
4.5
936
3.9

1983

LAWSUITS

42

Jury
Trial

NonJury
Trial

273
0.9
377
1.1
335
0.8
373
0.9

552
1.8
614
1.8
644
1.6
643
1.6

81
0.3
312
0.9
194
0.5
184
0.4

30,967
100.0
35,051
100.0
40,008
100.0
41,302
100.0

396
1.2
353
1.2
338
1.3
329
1.4

524
1.5
356
1.2
255
1.0
236
1.0

141
0.4
127
0.4
183
0.7
207
0.9

33,929
100.0
28,939
100.0
25,616
100.0
24,182
100.0

Other Total

Federal Judicial Center, supra note 1.

For the period following the enactment of the PLRA
(1997-2000), the most obvious change, of course, has been the rapid
and precipitous decline in the volume of prisoner litigation. Courts
are using the PLRA:
42 The dispositional categories used in this study were constructed by combining
dispositional categories used by the AO to classify dispositions as follows: Resolution
w/o Judgment (transfer to another district, remanded to state court, multi district
litigation transfer, remanded to U.S. agency, and statistical closing), Court Dismissal
(want of prosecution, lack ofjurisdiction, default, consent, motion before trial, other
dismissals, and judgment on other), Voluntary Dismissal (voluntarily dismissed), Settled
(settled dismissal), Jury Trial (jury verdict), Non-Jury Trial (directed verdict and court
trial), and Other (award of arbitrator, stayed pending bankruptcy, appeal affirmed
(magistrate judge), and appeal denied (magistrate judge)).
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Given the crush of inmate litigation, it was quite predictable that
judges would be quick to use this new weapon to clear their dockets.
. . . The courts have also started apprising inmate litigants of the
law's ramifications, in an attempt to have inmates regulate their own
actions before the new procedures authorized by the PLRA are used
against them.

43

If inmates observe the provisions of the PLRA and listen to warnings emanating from the courts, the observed drop should primarily
be a drop in frivolous litigation. Although the overarching pattern of
dispositions remains unchanged (most cases are dismissed and few
cases are resolved at trial), subtle and suggestive changes have occurred. Relatively more cases are being dismissed with little or no judicial involvement (e.g., dismissed for want of prosecution and for
lack of jurisdiction), fewer cases are being resolved through voluntary
dismissal or settlement, and jury trial rates are up. Part II provides a
more detailed look at the resolution of § 1983 lawsuits post-PLRA at
the circuit court level.
The data clearly show the prevalence of dismissals in the resolution of § 1983 lawsuits. As a consequence, speculation on the potential impact of the PLRA would benefit from a more nuanced
understanding of the lawsuits being dismissed. What is the reason for
dismissal? What share of the cases meet even the most basic procedural requirements and would remain eligible under the provisions of
the PLRA? While the AO does not compile this information, one extensive study casts light on the nature of prisoner litigation prior to
the enactment of PLRA. Hanson and Daley examined over 2700
§ 1983 cases resolved by U.S. district courts in nine states (Alabama,
California, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, New York, Penn44
sylvania, and Texas) during 1993.
Focusing strictly on the cases dismissed, Hanson and Daley's careful review of case files showed that the most frequent reason for a
court's decision to dismiss a § 1983 lawsuit was because the prisoner
failed to respond to a court order within a required time period (Figure 3).45
43 Kuzinski, supra note 7, at 387-88 (citations omitted).
44 HANSON & DALEY, supra note 11. The case-level analysis conducted by Hanson
and Daley found disposition patterns closely in line with data reported by the AO:
74% of § 1983 lawsuits were subject to a court dismissal, 20% were dismissed on defendant's motion, 4% were stipulated dismissals, and 2% were resolved at trial. Id. at
19.
45 For example, a prisoner might have failed to respond to a report prepared by
the correctional institution on the treatment of the prisoner. The court notifies the

prisoner that the report will be treated as a motion for summary judgment and that
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REASONS FOR COURT DIsMIssALs OF

§ 1983

LAWSUITS

Reasons
Plaintiff failed to comply with court rules (e.g., did -not respond
to court's requests for information in a timely manner,
nonindigent prisoner failed to pay filing fees)
No evidence of constitutional rights violation (e.g., action by
correctional officer might have been negligent but there is no
evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the prisoner)

N=
3136

38%

19%

Frivolous (i.e., no arguable basis in law or fact)

19%

Issue is noncognizable under § 1983 (e.g., habeas corpus)

7%

Defendant has immunity (e.g., judge, prosecutor)

4%

Defendant is not acting under color of state law (e.g., wife, fellow
prisoner)

3%

Other reasons (e.g., the issue is moot because the prisoner is no
longer incarcerated and sought declaratory relief)

9%

Total

99%

SOURCE: HANSON

& DALEY, supra note 11, at 20.

Additionally, if the court could determine no evidence of a constitutional rights violation, the case was dismissed (19%).46 Other reasons for court dismissals were that the lawsuits were truly frivolous
(e.g., the prisoner complained because he received chunky rather
than creamy peanut butter) (19%).47 Alternatively, cases were dismissed because the issue raised was not covered by the scope of § 1983
(e.g., the case is a challenge to the validity of conviction) (7%);48 the
defendant (e.g., state trial judge) had immunity (4%);49 or the defendant (e.g., privately retained criminal defense attorney) was not acting
under color of state law (3%).50
the motion will be granted, unless the prisoner files an objection. If the court neither
receives a response to the notice nor receives any objection to the motion, the court
thereby grants the motion.
46 For example, a prisoner may be injured after slipping on a wet floor outside
the cell. The court will dismiss this claim if there is no evidence of deliberate intent
by correctional officials to harm the prisoner by failing to maintain adequate physical
conditions. The slippery floor might be the result of negligence, but ordinary negligence is not a cognizable cause of action under § 1983. For this reason, the federal
court will dismiss the case as an invalid § 1983 cause of action and might suggest that
the prisoner pursue the matter as a tort action in state court. Id. at 19-20.
47 Id. at 20.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 20-21.
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What emerges from Figure 3 is that only 19% of the dismissed
cases survived even the most elemental procedural or substantive hurdles. This fraction was not dismissed because the prisoner-plaintiff
failed to comply with court rules or because the case was found to be
without a basis in fact or law. Instead, a court found that these cases
failed to meet the criterion of implicating a constitutional standard.
For example, a prison official might have been negligent in allowing
water to remain on a walkway, but a prisoner did not show that such
conduct was a product of deliberate indifference or wanton neglect.
What this extensive case study suggests is that just prior to the enactment of the PLRA, a sizable percentage of the prisoners' dismissed
§ 1983 lawsuits, perhaps as high as 81%, would likely find it difficult to
satisfy additional procedural requirements, such as those eventually
established under PLRA.
This empirical profile of how prisoner litigation was resolved prePLRA provides a framework and benchmark for examining prisoner
litigation in the post-PLRA world. As such, it provides three testable
propositions. First, if the PLRA is implemented in good faith, we
would expect to see an immediate and significant drop in the number
of prisoner litigation filings. The Hanson and Daley results suggest
that the number of lawsuits that will not sustain additional and new
procedural scrutiny may well be a majority of the cases. Of the 74% of
cases dismissed by a court before the enactment of the PLRA, as few as
19% were potentially robust enough to sustain strengthened procedural review. Hence, if the PLRA operates as conceived by its authors, as
many as 60% fewer § 1983 lawsuits will be filed after PLRA than
51
before.
Second, the twin factors of unsettled law and judicial independence lead us to expect non-uniformity in the trend and disposition
of prisoner lawsuits at the circuit level. The constitutional legitimacy
of the PLRA and its provisions is still being determined in the federal
courts. Although a majority of federal circuits have upheld the PLRA
51 Taking 81% of 74% yields 60%. The upper-bound prediction of a 60% decrease is a mid- to long-term projection. Initially, the decrease could be considerable
because many prisoners will be filing complaints with limited information on the
PLRA's provisions. As a result, in the short run there may be more than a 60% decrease in the number of § 1983 lawsuits as the initial wave of post-PLRA petitions fail
one or more of the new provisions and, thus, are not accepted as § 1983 lawsuits.
Over time, prisoners will gain information on the new rules (e.g., from jail house
lawyers or prisoner assistance groups). It is likely that, ultimately, prisoners will adapt
to the new system and file complaints that meet the new requirements. As a result,
the trend in § 1983 lawsuits will eventually reach a new, albeit lower, equilibrium relationship with prison population.
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and many constitutional challenges have been settled, the circuits
have moved at varying speeds and with varying levels of internal opposition. Each circuit has evolved its own style in implementing the
PLRA. This is hardly surprising given the substantive complexity of
the Act, and that, by virtue of jurisdictional and administrative inde52
pendence, no two circuit courts are alike.
Despite the adoption of uniform rules of appellate procedure in
1968, the power of circuit courts to define subsidiary rules lends surprisingly little standardization to internal decisionmaking or administrative practice. Therefore, the characteristics of each region of the
country within the jurisdiction of a particular circuit tend to be reflected in the business of each court. 53 To understand the regional
forces underlying the national trend and to understand differences in
the implementation strategies of different circuits, we conduct an
analysis of the impact of the PLRA at the circuit court level. This analysis also contributes to our knowledge about policy-implementation in
the federal court system.
Third, if the PLRA is operating as intended, we have definite expectations for where the decrease in filings should occur: the procedurally weak cases. To conclude that the PLRA is meeting a sound
and legitimate public policy goal, it is necessary to show that the new
provisions succeed in differentiating and eliminating the non-meritorious cases. The odds that federal judges will successfully discern the
meritorious cases increases considerably if the system is not overcrowded with the frivolous. Therefore, to evaluate fully the impact of
the PLRA, it will be necessary to determine whether the nature of prisoner lawsuits, their handling and outcomes have changed in line with
stated goals.
II.
A.

THE RESULTS

National Trends

Two previous studies examined the effects of the PLRA on a national level. An inquiry by Cheesman, Hanson, and Ostrom examined
historical patterns of filing of § 1983 lawsuits in U.S. district courts as

54
well as factors that were hypothesized to influence the rate of filing.

52 See HowARD, supra note 40 passim.
53 Among circuit courts there are differences in the composition of caseloads. See
Lawrence Baum et al., The Evolution of Litigation in the Federal Courts of AppeaLs:

1895-1975, 16 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 291 passim (1981) (analyzing the different caseloads
faced by different circuits). The rate at which litigants challenged decisions subject to
appeal has been previously documented. HowARD, supra note 40, at 23-33.
54 See Cheesman et al., supra note 23.
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They established a clear and strong relationship between the size of
5
the state prison population and the number of § 1983 lawsuits filed.
What is not obvious about this relationship is that it persisted over
previous decades despite substantial changes in legal doctrines and
legislation (e.g., CRIPA) designed to affect the rate of filing of such
lawsuits before the implementation of the PLRA.
Although Cheesman and his co-authors find that the PLRA has
significantly lowered the number of prisoner lawsuits filed, they hypothesize that the new lower, stable level of filings is a short-run phenomenon.5 6 They assert that prisoner litigation filing rates remain
tied to the number of state prisoners: the PLRA has merely altered the
proportion of inmates eligible or able to afford to litigate. The PLRA
is designed to discourage frivolous lwsuits, not all lawsuits. Provisions
of the PLRA will not affect all prisoners in the same way: "[h]ence,
whereas some share of the original pool of prisoners filing Section
1983 lawsuits will be eliminated because of eligibility or fiscal restrictions, prisoner litigation will remain related to state prison population. ' 57

Cheesman

and

his

co-authors

hypothesize

that

the

fundamental linkage between state prison population and the number of § 1983 lawsuits has not been broken, and that future increases
in prison population will lead to more lawsuits, albeit from a smaller
proportion of prisoners.
John Scalia provides a second, refined study.58 He examines the
rate of monthly § 1983 case filings from October 1991 to September
2000. Using the statistical technique of interrupted time-series analysis,5," Scalia demonstrates that the observed decline in § 1983 lawsuits
55
56

Id. at 94.
Cheesman and his co-authors explain:
Examining monthly data over the last six years shows that the PLRA produced an immediate drop in the volume of Section 1983 lawsuits. It also is
evident that the decreasing trend in the number of Section 1983 lawsuits
ended around March of 1997-almost exactly one year after the enactment
of the PLRA. Since then, the number of lawsuits has [stabilized at] between
2,000 and 2,500 per month.
Id. at 96 (citations omitted).
57 Id. at 99.
58 SCALIA, supra note 5.
59 Essentially, interrupted time series involves three steps: (1) fitting an
AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model to the pre-intervention
time series, (2) modeling the intervention, usually as a persistent change in level (a
"step") or a temporary change in level (a "pulse"), and (3) assessing the fit of the preintervention ARIMA model combined with the intervention model for the combined
pre- and post-intervention time series. The test of significance for the intervention
factor can be interpreted to assess the impact of the intervention. The time series
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that occurred after the implementation of the PLRA was statistically
significant. Scalia, measuring the filing rate as the number § 1983 lawsuits per 1000 prisoners, concludes "the PLRA resulted in approximately 3.4 fewer civil rights petitions filed per month for every 3,000
116
State prison inmates.
Our analysis of the national trend in prisoner lawsuits extends the
work of Scalia to determine the size of the drop as well as examining
the trend for evidence that it has re-established its relationship with
state prison population. We define the pre-PLRA period from April
1992 to April 1996 and the post-PLRA period from May 1996 to December 2001, a slightly longer time period than Scalia employed. 6 1
The following analyses are based on the number of lawsuits per 1000
prisoners (national level) and per 10,000 prisoners (circuit court
level). It is appropriate to compare filing rates when examining the
possible effects of the PLRA because, as discussed above, there is evidence that the number of lawsuits is propelled by the number of prisoners. 62 The use of rates minimize the chances of confusing the
effects of a change in prisoner population with the effects of PLRA.
As shown in Figure 4, the number of § 1983 lawsuits decreased
abruptly after enactment of PLRA. The trend continues downward,
although at a slower pace, during the remainder of the post-implementation period (i.e., after April 1996). There is a considerable difference in the average monthly number of lawsuits when the pre- and
post-implementation periods are compared (4.1 vs. 2.4 lawsuits per
63
1000 prisoners, respectively).
Section 1983 lawsuits have dropped significantly since passage of
the PLRA, confirming our first testable proposition at the national
data must either be stationary or be made stationary (usually by "differencing")
before the interrupted time series can be performed. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller
test is often used to test for stationarity. See, e.g.,
JEFF B. CROMWELL ET" AL., MULTIVARIATE TESTS FOR TIME SERIES MODELS

23 (1994).

60 SCALIA, supra note 5, at 7.
61 We also use the technique of interrupted time-series analysis that Scalia employs, after first conducting unit root tests to determine whether the national time
series is stationary. See, e.g.,James G.Mackinnon, Critical Values for Cointegration Tests,
in LONG-RUN ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS: READINGS IN COINTEGRATION (R.F. Engle &
C.W.J. Granger eds., 1991). The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test indicated that the national time series was stationary.
62 See Cheesman et al., supra note 23, at 98-102.
63 Pre-PLRA period Average: 4.1
Post-PLRA period Average: 2.43
Standard Deviation: .31
Standard Deviation: .56
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level. 64 Figure 4 reveals that the PLRA has affected both the volume
arid trend of prisoner litigation: the PLRA has resulted in a 40% decrease in the average monthly number of § 1983 cases filed nationally.
The post-PLRA trend is suggestive for two related issues. First,
based on the analysis of § 1983 cases dismissed pre-PLRA (Figure 3),
we hypothesized that as many as 60% of § 1983 complaints might not
withstand the additional procedural requirements established by the
PLRA. Clearly the size of the decrease is in line with this prediction.
But the extent to which the drop in § 1983 filings constitutes a drop in
the volume of "frivolous" litigation awaits further inquiry. The precise
nature of the cases not filed because of the PLRA's provisions (meritorious vs. nonmeritorious) is unknowable. However, in a subsequent
Section of this Article, we infer how the PLRA has affected the handling of prisoner lawsuits filed when we compare the manner of disposition for § 1983 lawsuits pre- and post-PLRA. 65 Second, there is no
evidence that the number of § 1983 lawsuits filed has resumed its earlier linkage with state prison population. Given that the provisions of
the PLRA remain a somewhat unsettled area of law, it remains an
open question as to whether the PLRA has successfully broken the
connection with state prison population.

64 P < .05. See Figure 16 for details.
65

See infra Part II.C.
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Circuit Trends

The U.S. circuit courts are prisms through which to view the effects of the PLRA on the filing rates in U.S. district courts.6 6 Variation
in terms of geography and demographics provides one rationale for
decomposing the national data on § 1983 filing trends to the circuit
court level. 67 Of more importance, though, the circuits are recog-

nized as the legal policymaking bodies in the federal court system.
They are in fact, if not in theory, the final arbiters of most legal disputes. They are in a position to render their distinctive takes on doctrine and to inform and guide U.S. district courts within their
respective jurisdictions. 68 Most of the expansion and the delineation
of prisoners' rights have been the product of circuit court decisions
with the U.S. Supreme Court rendering a handful of landmark decisions. As noted, because the courts of appeals have differed in their
interpretation of the PLRA provisions, 69 it bears investigating whether
the impact of the PLRA on prisoner litigation filing trends is consistent across the circuits. Thus, because the circuits reflect possible variations both in context and statutory interpretation, an issue for
66

In this Part of the Article, we continue to use a U.S. District Court database.

The national level findings discussed above are the national level aggregation of all
U.S. district courts, whereas this section is grouping U.S. district courts into one of
eleven sets with each set corresponding to the boundaries of a particular circuit's
jurisdiction. Hence, the data presented in this section are not appeals filed by prisoners under § 1983 in each of the circuits. They remain U.S. district court case filings.
The U.S. district court database used in this analysis was produced by the AO at the
request of the authors. As required by the terms of the grant from NIJ that funded
this research, 2001-IJ-CX-0013 (on file with authors), this data set will be sent to the
ICPSR at the end of the project (Aug. 2003), whereupon it will be available to other
researchers. Much of this data can also be found in ICPSR 8429, supra note 1.
67 Even conceding the arguable claim that the United States has a relatively homogenous culture compared to other countries, the states comprising virtually every
pair of non-adjoining Circuits intuitively seem different. For example, contrast the
Second Circuit (New York and Connecticut) and the Eighth Circuit (North Dakota,
South Dakota, Nebraska, Missouri, and Arkansas). Or the Eleventh Circuit (Florida
and Georgia) and the First Circuit (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts,
and Rhode Island).
68 Recent literature on the U.S. courts of appeals concludes that doctrinal differences among the circuits have declined in the last seventy years. However, differences
are believed to remain especially in the area of constitutional rights. For a discussion
of the decline in doctrinal differences among the circuits and the differences that still

remain, see generally, for example,

DONALD SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

(2000) (including in its discussion, seemingly, § 1983
and the new provisions of the PLRA).
IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEAL

69

See Butler, supra note 6, at 586 (noting that the "status of PLRA litigation varies

from circuit to circuit").
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examination is whether the consequences of the PLRA are similar or
70
different in the U.S. district courts among the circuits.
The basic research question of whether all individual circuits experienced a decrease in § 1983 lawsuits similar to that observed at the
national level is answered using interrupted time-series analysis (also
known as "intervention analysis"). The individual circuit court filing
trends are shown in Figures 5 to 15. Figure 16 displays the statistical
results that confirm the drop in the rate of prisoner litigation filings
observed following the passage of the PLRA is statistically significant at
the circuit level. 7' The lone exception is the Fifth Circuit,7 2 although
the trend in that circuit was downward before the enactment of PLRA
and has since continued apace. Hence, there is overall consistency in
the sense that, apart from the Fifth Circuit, the PLRA produced a statistically significant decrease in both the volume and trend of § 1983
lawsuits per 10,000 state prisoners in all circuits.

70 Court scholars make a dual assertion on how circuits manage to influence U.S.
district courts in desired ways. One element of influence is that the leadership of
each circuit's bench (i.e., chiefjudge and senior judges) will assign themselves opinion writing opportunities and will author precedent-setting opinions that define the
law and settle issues. Those opinions become cues for the U.S. district courts to use in
resolving cases before them by applying the law in a way consistent with the circuit
decisions. See HOWARD, supra note 40 passim. Additionally, each circuit is viewed by
some scholars as a separate, closed system of communication. U.S. district court
judges look first and primarily to decisions by their respective circuit judges, who, in
turn, look first and primarily to their respective colleagues. See, e.g., Robert A. Carp,
The Scope and Function of Intra-CircuitJudicial Communication: A Case Study of the Eighth
Circuit, 6 LAW & Soc'v REV. 405, 422-33 (1972). Following the suggestions of this
literature, the current research discusses legal decisions concerning the PLRA by circuit courts of appealsjudges. That discussion follows the analysis of the trends among
the circuits.
71 Prior to the interrupted time series analysis, the pre-intervention times series
for each Circuit was pre-tested for stationarity using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test,
after the recommended procedure of Francis X. Diebold & Lutz Killian, Unit-Root
Tests Are Useful for Selecting Forecasting Models, 18 J. Bus. & ECON. STAT. 265, 269-71
(2000). These tests revealed that the time series for each circuit were stationary.
72 To understand the unexpected results for the Fifth Circuit, we examined filing
patterns in the three states that comprise this circuit (Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi) by means of interrupted time series analyses. While statistically significant declines were noted for both Louisiana and Mississippi, the decline was not significant
in Texas. Because Texas has a much larger prison population than either of the other
two states, the pattern noted for this state tended to define the pattern observed for
the entire circuit. It is not clear at the present time why the PLRA did not affect the
filing rate of § 1983 lawsuits in Texas.
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Although all circuits (except the Fifth) showed a statistically significant drop in prisoner litigation following enactment of the PLRA,
the extent of the decline varied considerably. As shown in Figure 16,
the percentage change in the average monthly filing rates ranged
from a decrease of 31 % in the Ninth Circuit to 74% in the Second
Circuit. The size of the drop between the pre-PLRA and post-PLRA
time periods is measured using the "step" statistic. A negative and
statistically significant step indicates that the PLRA demarcates a fundamental decrease in the filing rate. The larger the value of the step
statistic, the greater the difference in the trends. As Figure 16 shows,
the step statistic is significant in all but the Fifth Circuit, and the size
of the step varies from -47.84 in the Eighth Circuit to -5.39 in the
Second Circuit.
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LAWSUITS PER 10,000 PRISONERS BEFORE AND

AFrER PLRA
PRE-PLRA
(April 1992-

POST-PLRA
(April 1996 -

March 1996)

December 2000)

% Change:
Pre- to
Circuit"
1

Standardized

Average

Post-PLRA

20.02

13.54

-32.37

-5.94

-0.30

-5.39

-0.20
-0.37

2

26.78

21.31

-20.43

3

48.96

27.01

-44.84

-17.99

-37.86

-12.11

44.49

4

Step

Step

Average

27.64

-0.2 (NS)

-0.27
3

0.00

5

48.72

28.65

-41.19

6

34.81

18.87

-45.78

-14.06

-0.40

7

49.23

24.03

-51.19

-18.88

-0.38

8

87.10

34.48

-60.41

-47.84

-0.55

-8.66

-0.30

9

28.88

20.06

-30.54

10

43.73

20.49

-53.16

-22.02

-0.50

11

44.18

27.73

-37.23

-13.99

-0.32

-0.33
-1.36
-40.41
2.43
4.08
National
1. Circuits are rate of filing per 10,000 prisoners
2. National are rate of filing per 1000 prisoners
3. NS: No statistically significant change between the before and after trends

The step statistic confirms that the PLR.A has led to a significant
decrease in § 1983 cases in all circuits (except the Fifth Circuit), but
that the level of change varies by circuit. In addition, this analysis
helps clarify whether the extent of change in each circuit post-PLRA is
related to the volume of litigation pre-PLRA. Perhaps circuits with
high pre-PLRA filing rates (e.g., the Eighth Circuit) had proportionately more filings of procedurally weak lawsuits than circuits with low
filing rates (e.g., the First Circuit), and so would be impacted more
profoundly by the PLRA than circuits with low filing rates. To adjust
for the pre-PLRA § 1983 caseload volume, a standardized measure of
change is calculated. This measure-the "standardized step"-is the
ratio of the step to the average pre-PLRA filing rate for each circuit.
The circuits were ranked according to the size of their standardized
step and also by their pre-PLRA § 1983 lawsuit filing rate and the rankings. Spearman's Rank Order Correlation was then calculated between the two sets of rankings and found to be non-significant
(Spearman's r = .382, p < .247). 7" Thus, the § 1983 lawsuit filing rate
73

See, e.g., DAMODAR N. GUIJARATI, BAsic; ECONOMETRICS 372 (2001).
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prior to the PLRA is not significantly related to the size of the decrease in prisoner litigation post-PLRA. We can conclude, then, that
the PLRA is having a differential impact in the circuits and is operating in a more subtle manner than would be expected based on the
74
size of the pre-PLRA filing rate alone.
C. Manner of Disposition
If the PLRA is operating as envisioned by its authors, we have
certain expectations about the types of cases that will no longer be
filed in the federal courts or that will be summarily dismissed. The
Act prohibits inmates from bringing suit until all available administrative remedies have been exhausted as well as mandating dismissal for
claims found to be frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim.
Such a change in filing behavior would also be expected to produce a
corresponding change in the pattern of case resolutions in U.S. district courts. For example, if the PLRA is serving to distinguish and
reduce the number of nonmeritorious cases relative to meritorious
cases, there should be relatively fewer court dismissals for frivolousness, relatively more cases dismissed for failure to implicate a constitutional standard, and relatively more trials than before the PLRA.
While a complete analysis of this issue will require systematic investigation at the individual case level, we can examine AO data on the manner of resolution to gain preliminary insight into the changing nature
of prisoner litigation.
We select four disposition categories employed by the AO in reporting resolutions of § 1983 cases for closer examination: court dismissal rates (typically early dismissals), voluntary dismissal rates,
settlement rates, and jury trial rates. Using the AO data, Figure 17
compares the proportion of cases resolved by each of the four dispositional categories at the circuit court level in 1995 (the last full year
before implementation of the PLRA) and in 2000 (the latest year for
74 Potential (but currently unmeasured) factors that may explain the size of the
standardized step include differences in (1) the vigor with which the circuits have
implemented the provisions of the PLRA; (2) the composition of § 1983 lawsuits at
the circuit level, particularly with regards to the proportion that could be classified as
frivolous; and (3) the availability of procedural remedies for inmates to resolve their
grievances without recourse to federal courts. In addition, several states have implemented their own versions of the PLRA, and such legislation may be associated with
larger decreases in § 1983 lawsuits: "[f]rom 1994 through 1996, 21 states had passed
or were considering legislation similar to the PLRA." Kuzinski, supra note 7, at 375
n.78 (citing Joseph Wharton, Courts Now Out of job as Jailers:New Law To End Prison
Oversight Applauded by State Attorneys General, 82 A.B.A. J. 40, 41 (1998)).
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which resolution data were available).75 A "test of proportions" was
used to determine whether there was a statistically significant change
in the composition of dispositions pre- and post-PLRA. The significance tests summarized in Figure 18 confirm that aspects of the manner in which § 1983 lawsuits are disposed changed between 1995 and
2000 in all circuit courts. However, the structure and direction of
76
change varies considerably from circuit to circuit.
FIGURE 17.

CIRCUIT COURT MANNER OF DISPOSITION FOR §
LAWSUITS: COMPARING

Court

Voluntary

Dismissals

Dismissals

1995

AND

1983

2000

Settled

Jury Verdict

Circuit

1995

2000

1995

2000

1995

2000

1995

2000

First

70.3

82.5

12.0

7.0

7.1

4.8

0.5

1.3

Second

82.4

75.4

3.3

4.2

4.7

9.3

1.0

3.3

Third

58.8

67.1

3.4

3.2

29.6

9.5

0.9

1.1

Fourth

89.2

88.2

4.7

4.1

2.6

2.3

0.4

0.5

Fifth

78.5

78.6

4.0

8.0

6.6

3.6

1.0

2.0

Sixth

83.9

88.2

6.7

2.2

2.9

3.0

1.3

1.0

Seventh

82.8

74.8

6.2

10.6

3.7

7.2

1.1

2.1

Eighth

70.0

82.6

16.6

5.0

2.0

2.1

1.4

1.6

Ninth

83.0

85.6

6.1

5.3

4.5

3.0

0.5

0.8

Tenth

81.1

65.1

6.0

8.8

1.4

2.2

0.0

0.3

Eleventh

84.4

87.7

4.8

3.5

3.2

1.0

0.7

1.2

SOURCE: ICPSR 8429, supra note 1.
75

Aggregate statistics at the national level are shown in Figure 2.
76 A '+' indicates that the proportion is significantly higher in 2000, a '-' indicates
the proportion is significantly lower in 2000, and a blank cell indicates no significant
change between 1995 and 2000. Significance measured at P < .10.
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CIRCUIT COURT MANNER OF DISPOSITION FOR §

LAWSUITS: STATISTICALLI

1983

SIGNIFICANT CHANGE BETWEEN

1995

AND

2000

Court
Dismissals

Voluntary
Dismissals

Settled

Jury Verdict

First

+

-

-

+

Second

-

+

+

+

Third

+

Circuit

Fourth
Fifth

+

Sixth

+

-

Seventh

-

+

Eighth

+

-

Ninth

+

Tenth
Eleventh

+
+

+

-

-

+

-

+

+

+

+

-

-

+

SOURCE: ICPSR 8429, supra note 1.

On closer inspection, three patterns emerge. First, if the PLRA is
serving to siphon off nonmeritorious cases, then we expect that jury
trials will account for an increased proportion of resolutions postPLRA. If some procedurally weak cases are no longer filed, then the
relative share of meritorious cases should rise and we should see an
increase in the jury trial rate. Figure 18 shows that jury trial rates have
risen significantly in seven circuit courts and are up (but not significantly) in three others (the lone decrease is in the Sixth Circuit).
However, the proportion of resolutions accounted for by jury trial remains small in all circuits.
Second, of the eight circuit courts that show a significant change
in both court dismissals and voluntary dismissals, the changes are in
the opposite direction. That is, post-PLRA, if fewer prisoner lawsuits
are resolved by court dismissal, then more are resolved by voluntary
dismissal and vice versa.
Third, and related, in the seven circuit courts where there has
been a significant change in both court dismissals and settlements, the
change is also consistently in the opposite direction. When court dismissals are down, settlements are up.
Our interpretation of these changes in dispositional outcomes begins with the fact that the total number of prisoner lawsuits has
dropped significantly, and, with the assumption that the reduction in
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cases docketed post-PLRA implies that, on average, the remaining
cases are given more time and attention. Moreover, we look for evidence that the Act is serving to reduce the proportion of nonmeritorious cases, while increasing the likelihood that the meritorious will
receive appropriate judicial review. Given the bluntness of the dispositional categories employed by the AO, this reading of the data is
necessarily speculative.
That the PLRA is operating as intended is most apparent in the
disposition patterns observed in the Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits. Here, the proportion of cases resolved by court dismissal has
declined and the proportion resolved by voluntary dismissal, settlement, and jury trial have increased. Proponents will likely take the
decline in court dismissals as evidence that inmates are learning of the
PLRA's legal consequences and modifying their actions so as to prevent the provisions of the legislation being used against them. On the
other hand, if one still questions the inmate learning curve, the drop
in litigation may signal more effective "pre-screening" of prisoner
complaints at the district court level and the elimination of frivolous
petitions prior to docketing. Regardless of why court dismissals are
down, increases in the other dispositional categories suggest the remaining prisoner petitions (potentially more meritorious) are receiving greater court consideration. This observation follows from the
recognition that voluntary dismissals, settlements, and jury trials represent litigation that typically received closer judicial attention and
where the prisoner plaintiff might have gained some type of favorable
outcome.
The proportion of cases resolved by court dismissal rose in six
circuits between 1995 and 2000. This increase was accompanied by a
statistically significant decline in either the proportion of cases resolved by voluntary dismissal (i.e., Sixth and Eighth Circuits) or settlement (i.e., Third Circuit) or both (i.e., First, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits). Because cases voluntarily dismissed and cases settled potentially signal more extensive judicial review, the decrease will be viewed
by some as evidence that the PLRA is making it more difficult for cases
with possible merit to succeed.
An alternative perspective is that the PLRA contributed in two
ways to the decrease in these two dispositional categories without violating the basic value of due process through dismissal of possible
meritorious lawsuits. A primary way arises from the administrative
remedy procedures that prisoners are required to exhaust under the
new terms of the PLRA. These forums are precisely the mechanism
that can produce the same result as gained in court for particular
kinds of cases. Simply stated, the cases that were settled or resulted in
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a voluntary dismissal before the PLRA was adopted are amenable to
administrative resolution in lieu of litigation. These may be cases
where neither the prisoner nor state government wants or needs to
litigate to vindicate its position. They might, for example, involve a
prisoner receiving an apology, receiving a new prosthetic, or having
an infraction removed from a disciplinary record. This situation is
consistent with reports from states that the "win" rate for prisoners
under the administrative remedies is many times greater than victories
in court.
A secondary way that the PLRA might have contributed to fewer
settlements is because the reduction in the number of cases docketed
after the PLRA increases the time that courts can devote to each case.
An increase in judicial time and attention might have detected more
clearly the true strengths and weaknesses of cases. As a result, weaker
cases are more subject to court dismissal rather than settlement, and
stronger cases are more subject to jury trial rather than voluntary dismissal or settlement. Consistent with this perspective, jury trial rates
are up after the PLRA.
Thus, the PLRA's successful effort to curtail prisoner litigation is
not necessarily achieved by introducing barriers that unfairly deny
even "little" wins to prisoners. On the contrary, the PLRA by design
and effect might be a sound public policy response that fairly, but
firmly, differentiates cases for the most appropriate handling.
CONCI.,USION

The Prison Litigation Reform Act has produced a significant reduction in the number of prisoner lawsuits coming to the federal
courts. There are simply fewer cases filed under § 1983 of the U.S.
Code in U.S. district courts than there were before the provisions of
the PLRA took effect. This Article shows that the decrease in § 1983
litigation, which occurred throughout the U.S. circuit courts of appeal, is striking in both magnitude and scope. The Fifth Circuit is an
exception, where a decrease in § 1983 filings occurred before the new
law was adopted and continued after the law was passed.
Proponents of the PLRA will point to this dramatic change in the
volume and trend of prisoner litigation as evidence of the Act's suc-

cess: prisoner lawsuits dropped by 40% between 1996 and 2000.
Clearly, the goal of reducing the share of federal judicial workload
devoted to prisoner litigation has been achieved. Moreover, supporters of the PLRA can justify the rationale for the decrease: most cases
filed pre-PLRA did not meet basic procedural requirements and were
resolved by court dismissal. The problematic nature of these lawsuits
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was clarified in the findings of Hanson and Daley.7 7 Their extensive
examination of prisoner lawsuits filed just prior to the PLRA show few
able to withstand scrutiny and pass the basic, existing requirements of
suing someone acting under color of state law without immunity over
an issue cognizable under § 1983 that rises to the level of a deprivation of their constitutional rights.
Yet, we do not know the nature of the lawsuits no longer filed or
dismissed through the new procedures authorized by the PLRA. Critics of the PLRA are concerned that the new provisions such as those
related to filing fees and three strikes will preclude filing of the meritorious as well as the frivolous. 78 Proponents have not proven that the
elimination of frivolous lawsuits has been the source of the drop in
§ 1983 filings. Looking to the available data is suggestive but
incomplete.
In the aggregate, there is evidence of little change when the manner of disposition for prisoner litigation is compared pre- and postPLRA. The proportion of cases dismissed outright remains at about
80%. It appears prisoners continue to file procedurally weak lawsuits
in large numbers and, in response, they continue to be dismissed by
the U.S. district courts.
However, going inside the manner of disposition numbers offers
some support to those concerned that the PLRA has inhibited meritorious claims in their battle for recognition. If operating as intended,
the new PLRA provisions allow the federal courts to deny complaints
that in the past were accepted only to be dismissed for having fundamental flaws. In fact, three circuits show a proportional decline in
court dismissals and a proportional increase in voluntary dismissals,
settlements, and jury trials. On the other hand, court dismissals have
risen proportionally in six circuit courts, while dismissals, settlements,
and jury trials have proportionately declined. The bluntness of the
AO data precludes us from determining what this pattern implies
about the differentiation between meritorious and nonmeritorious
cases. Interpretation largely rests on one's views about the use and
effectiveness of the new administrative remedy procedures that prisoners are required to exhaust under the PLRA.
This Article goes a long way in informing the effect of the PLRA
on the volume, trend, and outcome of prisoner litigation and focuses
attention on directions for future inquiry. The dramatic change in
volume and trend highlights the need to better understand the implementation process of the PLRA and the roles of key constituencies
77
78

11 passim.

HANSON & DALEY, supra note

See, e.g., Lukens, supra note 6.
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that stood to benefit most from the legislation (U.S. district and circuit court judges, state attorneys general, and state and local correctional officials). The apparent success of the PLRA in accomplishing
the primary objective of reducing the volume of § 1983 litigation in
federal courts is remarkable, given Congress's previous unsuccessful
efforts to regulate prisoner lawsuits.
A comprehensive assessment of the change in the manner of case
resolution pre- and post-PLRA demands a case-level examination of its
effect on the composition of § 1983 lawsuits docketed and resolved.
Have the cases changed in subject matter of the issues? Which cases
are resolved quickly under the PLRA? And which ones go to trial? Is
the number of prisoners who prevail at trial after the PLRA larger,
smaller, or about the same as before the PLRA? Answers to these
questions are ultimately needed to assess the fairness and "efficiency"
of the PLRA in eliminating procedurally weak cases but not impeding
the flow of meritorious cases into federal courts. Until these questions
are addressed-through case level inquiry-the final chapter on the
PLRA cannot be written.

